ACTIVE SHOOTER/ TERRORISM

SUBJECT: Active Shooter/Terrorism Response Protocol

PURPOSE: The purpose of this protocol is to save as many lives as possible, as quickly as possible, with consideration to the safety of those responding and to provide a comprehensive agency response plan for active shooter/terrorism situations. The deployment techniques and tactics described herein should be interpreted as options, not as required actions that must be taken in every case. There may be alternatives other than those described in this protocol. Each situation is unique, and the police response will depend on the known information about the situation and threat(s), the structure or area involved, the availability of additional resources, and other factors.

POLICY: It is the policy of this Department that officers shall use only that force which is necessary to accomplish lawful objectives given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event. An officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officer’s own life, or in the defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury.

PROCEDURE
I. Definitions
   A. **Active Shooter/Terrorism**: One or more suspect(s) who, as police respond to the scene, are actively killing and/or causing serious, life-threatening bodily injury to multiple victims. The overriding objective of the suspect(s) appears to be that of mass murder, rather than other criminal conducts such as robbery or hostage taking.
   B. **Barricaded Suspect**: Suspect is in a position of advantage, usually barricaded in a room or building. Suspect is armed and refuses to surrender to police.
   C. **Incident Transition**: That point during the incident where it becomes clear that the active shooter has become inactive and has ceased their violent, assaulative behavior.
   D. **Inner Perimeter**: Deployment of officers behind cover and concealment around the area of the suspect, with the primary goal of containing the suspect and preventing escape.
   E. **Police Rifle**: Deployment of trained officers with a patrol rifle or carbine capable of accurate, high-powered fire at ranges of 25-50 yards or more.
F. **Extraordinary Deployment:** Deployment of a small team of officers to move towards and contact the active shooter, or to rescue trapped and injured persons, or to search and clear dangerous areas.

G. **Venue Agency:** California State University, Fullerton is the venue agency within whose geographic jurisdiction the incident occurs.

II. Outline of Primary Points of Operation

A. **Safety Priorities:**
   1. Hostages
   2. Innocent Persons
   3. Police and Emergency Personnel
   4. Suspect

B. **Reasonable chance of success:** Incident Commander must realistically assess situation and the threat(s) involved (e.g., numbers of suspects and their organization, types of weapons, etc)
   1. Any deployment of officers into a dangerous situation must be for a clear and obtainable objective, and not be reckless or irresponsible
   2. The officers’ numbers, equipment, experience, and training must provide for a reasonable chance of success
   3. Officers are not expected to operate alone or embark on suicide missions
   4. Officers will not enter buildings that are actively on fire

C. **Operational Goals (not necessarily in order):**
   1. Containment [CALEA 91.1.6d]
   2. Apprehension of suspect(s)
   3. Neutralization of threat(s)
   4. Evacuation of persons at risk
   5. Transition to SWAT or tactical teams (whenever possible)
   6. Rendering scene safe
   7. Preservation of crime scene
   8. Collection of evidence

D. **Use of Force Policy:**
   1. Deployed officers should operate within the guidelines of the University Police as detailed in the policies and General Orders that relate to the use of force.
   2. Any incident-specific orders related to use of force issues must come from the on-scene Incident Commander.

III. Jurisdiction, Organization, and Communications

A. During any large emergency, the effectiveness of a multi-agency response usually depends on knowing who is in charge, a workable organizational structure, and reliable communications.
B. The following points are important considerations for active shooter/terrorism planning, training, and response:

1. A CSUF Police Officer will generally serve as Incident Commander unless the situation dictates consideration of another option.
2. The Campus Community will be immediately notified utilizing the campus notification system of any situations involving an active shooter or gunman on campus. The Incident Commander or Command Staff will determine if a shelter in place message will be sent by following the procedure in G.O. 5-14. [CALEA 91.1.6a]
3. The Law Enforcement Incident Command System (LEICS) should be used to organize, manage, and deploy resources;
4. Specialized teams and units for active shooter response and management may be established within the LEICS (attachment);
5. Executives, managers, and supervisors from other agencies will be needed at the Command Post to fill Section supervisory positions within the LEICS, and to support the Incident Commander in evaluating information and making decisions;
6. Early in the response, a dedicated “Tactical” radio frequency and dispatcher should be established for the officers in the Inner Perimeter, Police Rifle officers, and Extraordinary Deployment teams;
7. A Staging Area and a Command Post should be established and staffed;
8. Immediate notification will be made by communications at the direction of the Incident Commander to outside Police, Fire and medical agencies requesting their response [CALEA 91.1.6b];
9. Additional guidelines are listed in the Active Shooter Response Checklist (attachment).

IV. Initial Deployment Options

A. **General:** The reality of an in-progress active shooter situation is that there are many more urgent tasks to be accomplished than there are personnel available and organized to accomplish those tasks. The dynamics of the incident may require the change of emphasis from one deployment option to another, and it is likely that several options will be used before the incident is resolved. Rarely, a local SWAT or tactical team may be immediately available to fill the role of a deployment option. More likely, multiple officers from different agencies will have to work together as part of an ad-hoc team. The four initial deployment options are: Evacuation or Shelter in Place, Inner Perimeter, Police Rifle, and Extraordinary Deployment Teams.

B. **Evacuation or Shelter in Place:** Officers may discover that there are large numbers of assembled people who are trapped or in significant danger. To save the maximum number of lives, it may be appropriate for officers to initiate evacuation of those persons; delegating management of the evacuation to on-site leaders and authorities whenever possible. Depending upon the situation sheltering in place may be a better tactic then evacuation. Sheltering in place is a tactic used when people are unable to safely escape the area an active shooter is in. [CALEA 91.1.6d]
C. **Inner Perimeter:** In nearly every situation, it is critically important to quickly establish a perimeter of inward-facing officers, behind cover/concealment around the structure or area in which the active shooter/terrorist incident is taking place. The primary purpose of this inner perimeter is to keep the active shooter/terrorist contained, and prevent the suspect from moving to an area with more potential victims. Secondary missions of inner perimeter officers include directing escaping persons to safe assembly points and collecting intelligence about the suspect’s location and actions. [CALEA 91.1.6d]

D. **Patrol Rifle:** A patrol rifle should generally be deployed as soon as possible, because handguns and shotguns have limited effectiveness at the ranges involved in the early phases of an active shooter/terrorism response. Semi-automatic carbines are appropriate weapons for inner perimeter officers, and for extraordinary deployment teams. A patrol rifle may be the only deployment option that can immediately defend innocent lives in the event the active shooter/terrorist has taken a position of advantage over an area with many potential victims (i.e. A suspect acting as a sniper from windows or a roof of a building, or in a parking lot or open area where officers cannot set an Inner Perimeter)

E. **Extraordinary Deployment Teams:** In some situations, the only option with a reasonable chance of success may be to send an organized team of officers directly into the structure or area where the active shooter incident is taking place. Factors that may justify the use of extraordinary deployment teams include [CALEA 91.1.6c]:

1. The active shooter/terrorist is continuing to display aggressive, deadly behavior, and there are more lives believed to be at risk;
2. The active shooter/terrorist is moving within a complex enclosed structure or large area, and the suspect’s location is not known;
3. Innocent persons are believed to be hiding or trapped within the area or structure and are at risk;
4. Gravely injured victims are believed to be trapped within the structure or area and must be aided and/or evacuated immediately to prevent death;
5. Other deployment options are not available, practical, timely, or likely to succeed.

V. **Extraordinary Deployment Teams**

A. **General:** An extraordinary deployment team generally consists of three to five officers arranged in a diamond formation, with firearms pointed outward so as to provide 360-degree security for the team. Whenever possible, the team leader should be a CSUF Police Officer, and should be positioned in the middle of the team so as to be able to communicate effectively and control the team’s movements. A semi-automatic police rifle is an appropriate weapon to have at the front of the team. The circumstances of the incident may dictate some modifications of these tactics.
B. Prior to deployment, the team should take a moment to rehearse, and to ensure that all members know their role within the team’s mission. There are three different missions for extraordinary deployment teams: **Contact** with the suspect, **Rescue** of injured, or trapped persons, and **Final Clearing** of an area for hidden persons or dangerous conditions. An extraordinary deployment team can have only one mission at a time.

1. **Contact Team:** The mission is to enter the structure or area where the active shooter/terrorist suspect is believed to be and to locate and stop the threat. This may include arrest, containment, or the use of deadly force. Guidelines for deployment of a Contact Team include [CALEA 91.1.6c]:
   a. Entering from an inconspicuous side door or window whenever possible;
   b. Moving directly towards the threat;
   c. Bypassing open doors, injured persons and explosive devices;
   d. Clearing rooms using dynamic entry of two or more officers; and
   e. Transmitting route, current situation and conditions via radio.

2. **Rescue Team:** The mission of a Rescue Team is to locate and evacuate injured victims and trapped persons. This may include escorting or carrying people out; or calling in additional help to take over the evacuation. When Fire Agency personnel from Orange County are available; the Orange County Chiefs’ of Police and Sheriff’s Association protocol #136 for Active Shooter Incident Response should be followed.

3. Guidelines for deployment of a Rescue Team include:
   a. Following the route of the Contact Team;
   b. Stopping at all doors and rooms within a structure and systematically conducting searches using dynamic room entries of two or more officers; and
   c. Transmitting route, current situation, and conditions via radio.
   d. The Rescue Team must be prepared to encounter a (second) suspect, at which time the Rescue Team will assume the role and mission of a Contact Team.

4. **Final Clearing Team:** The mission of a Final Clearing Team is to methodically search the structure or area of an active shooter to ensure that the scene is safe and that all hidden and/or injured persons have been evacuated. Guidelines for deployment of a Final Clearing Team include:
   a. Use of “fresh” personnel other than those involved in original Contact and Rescue Teams;
   b. Following the route of the Contact and Rescue Teams;
   c. Conducting slow, methodical searches for secondary suspects, hidden persons, booby traps, and dangerous conditions;
   d. Transmitting route, situation, and conditions via radio; and
   e. Marking “safe” on the entrance door to any area that has been searched and deemed safe by the Final Clearing Team leader.

VI. Incident Transition
A. At any point within an active shooter/terrorism incident, if the suspect becomes inactive and ceases his or her deadly behavior, the deployed officers shall notify the Incident Commander. The suspect should be contained within a tight inner perimeter, and should be treated as a barricaded suspect. Injured victims and innocent persons should be evacuated.

B. Additional deployment options would include, but are not limited to, establishing an outer perimeter, initiating crisis negotiations, use of chemical agents, and deployment of police precision rifle teams.

VII. Training/Evaluation

A. The Chief and Command Staff of the University Police Department concur that regular training using this protocol is vital to successful application in a real incident.

B. Such training should:

1. Be consistent with the basic guidelines and tactics outlined in this protocol;
2. Emphasize the multiple agency organization, teamwork, and communication aspects of active shooter response;
3. Include management and communications personnel as well as patrol officers; and
4. Involve role-playing scenarios to add realism to the training.

C. The appropriate Command Staff shall conduct an annual review of training and tactics as well as meet with stakeholders to review the response plan. A report documenting the findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Chief of Police. [CALEA 91.1.6c]

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ATTACHMENTS:
Active Shooter Response Checklist
Active Shooter Field Units Checklist
Active Shooter Dispatch Checklist
L.E.I.C.S. Organizational Chart